News Details

United States Supreme Court Leaves No Doubt as to Which Legal Standard Applies to Force Cases Involving Pretrial Detainees

KINGSLEY v. HENDRICKSON
576 U. S. ____ (2015)

 

On June 22, 2015, the United States Supreme Court clarified the legal standard by which jailers may be held liable for their use of force upon a pretrial detainee.

The Fourth Amendment protects people who are not in jail from unreasonable police actions. Convicted prisoners are protected from "cruel and unusual punishment" by the Eighth Amendment.

In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, n. 10 (1989), the Supreme Court left open "the question whether the Fourth Amendment continues to provide individuals with protection against deliberate use of excessive physical force beyond the point at which arrest ends and pretrial detention begins."  After Graham, the Ninth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment applies to excessive force cases involving situations of "warrantless, post-arrest, pre-arraignment custody." Pierce v. Multnomah County, 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added); Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1197 (9th Cir. 2002) and Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 415 (9th Cir. 2003). But the question of whether force claims by post-arraignment, pre-trial detainees should be analyzed under the Fourth or Eighth Amendments remained an open question in the Ninth Circuit.

The Supreme Court has now definitively addressed this issue, holding that under 42 U.S.C. ?1983, a pretrial detainee (whether pre-arraignment or post-arraignment) need now only show that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was "objectively unreasonable" in order to prevail.

Michael Kingsley was awaiting trial in a Wisconsin county jail on a drug charge. Officers told him to remove a sheet of paper which was covering a light in his cell and Kingsley refused. Officers eventually approached the cell and ordered Kingsley to stand, back up to the door, and keep his hands behind him. When Kingsley refused to comply, the officers hand?cuffed him, forcibly removed him from the cell, carried him to a receiving cell, and placed him face down on a bunk with his hands handcuffed behind his back. The officers testified that Kingsley resisted their efforts to remove his handcuffs. Kingsley testified that he did not resist. All agree that a sergeant placed his knee in Kingsley's back and Kingsley told him in "impolite language" to get off. Kingsley testified that the sergeant and an officer then slammed his head into the concrete bunk—an allegation the officers deny. The parties did agree, however, that the sergeant ordered an officer to stun Kingsley with a Taser, and that the officer applied the Taser for about five seconds. The officers then left him in the receiving cell for about 15 minutes, after which they returned and removed the handcuffs.

During the trial, the judge essentially told the jury that the officers must win unless Kingsley could prove the officers knew their actions could unduly harm him—that they were subjectively aware that their use of force was unreasonable, but went through with their actions anyway. The judge instructed the jury that Kingsley would need to prove that the officers acted with a malicious state of mind. Kingsley argued that he only need to prove the officers' use of force was objectively unreasonable in order to win his lawsuit—that the subjective intent of the officers was irrelevant in reaching the ultimate decision—and the United States Supreme Court has now agreed.

How is this new standard different than the standard that applied before for pretrial, post-arraignment detainees? Previously, to prove a claim for use of excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial, post-arraignment detainee was required to prove the use of force by his jailers "shocked the conscience" so as to constitute excessive force. This meant the inmate was previously required to prove that his jailers inflicted pain or injury "unnecessarily and wantonly" and acted "maliciously and sadistically" for the "purpose of causing harm" rather than having acted in a good faith effort to maintain and restore discipline. These extra elements made it more difficult for a pretrial, post-arraignment detainee to prevail.

The main point of Kingsley v. Hendrickson is the issue of intent. Though the subjective intent of jailers is no longer an element to be proven in these detainee cases, the following considerations may bear on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the force used: the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff 's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.

Photo: Wisconsin jail, courtesy Wiki Commons. 

"Objective reasonableness" is, of course, the legal standard that applies in an excessive force lawsuit arising from force used to effect an arrest under the Fourth Amendment. In ways, it will now be easier to train deputies and jailers, as the legal standard by which their actions will be judged is now the same " Graham v. Connor"standard, regardless of whether the force was used on the street or in a jail.

Remember, however, the distinction in force cases between pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners is still important in an era where convicted inmates are serving longer sentences in a county jail rather than in state prison. A convicted inmate still has much more to prove in an excessive force claim than one who is simply awaiting trial because the "cruel and unusual punishment" standard (for now) still applies.


Timothy J. Kral has represented law enforcement agencies and peace officers for more than 15 years in a wide variety of litigated cases, including all aspects of law enforcement use of force. Mr. Kral also handles jail and prison litigation for both the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and various county jails on claims of constitutionally inadequate medical care, in custody deaths, alleged failure to protect, and lawsuits claiming unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Mr. Kral served as a police officer before attending law school and has been a reserve police officer since 2002.
For questions or comments about this article or related legal issues, contact Mr. Kral at (213) 624-6900 Ext. 2282 or via email at [email protected].